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IN RE RENSHA W: "EXTENSIONS OF CREDIT" BY
AN EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTION-ARE THEY
EXEMPT FROM DISCHARGE UNDER
SECTION 523(A)(8) OF THE BANKRUPTCY CODE?
I. INTRODUCTION
An important reality of modem education is that many students rely on
some form of financial assistance, other than family, to pay for their education.!
This assistance comes from a variety of sources and usually takes the form of
scholarships, grants, employment, or loans.2 Most of these forms of assistance,
especially loans, have important consequences if a student later decides to file
for bankruptcy.
3
Typically, a debtor in bankruptcy is allowed to discharge all debts that
existed prior to the date of filing for bankruptcy.' Section 523 of the
Bankruptcy Code, however, exempts certain debts from discharge; student
loans are among the exemptions enumerated.' Section 523(a)(8) of the
Bankruptcy Code, in its current form, provides:
(a) A discharge under section 727, 1141, 1228(a), 1228(b), or
1328(b) of this title does not discharge an individual debtor
from any debt-
(8) for an educational benefit overpayment or loan made,
insured or guaranteed by a governmental unit, or made under
any program funded in whole or in part by a governmental
unit or nonprofit institution, or for an obligation to repay
funds received as an educational benefit, scholarship or
stipend, unless--... excepting such debt from discharge
1. See DEP'T OF EDUC., DIGEST OF EDUCATION STATISTICS, 1999 ch. 3 (2000), available at
http:/noes.ed.gov/pubs2000/digest99/Chapter3.html (last visited Feb. 2, 2001) ("For the 1998-
1999 academic year, annual prices for undergraduate tuition, room, and board were estimated
to be $7,093 at public colleges and $19,410 at private colleges.").
2. See EDGAR W. MILLER, FINANCIAL AID: A KEY PART OF COLLEGE, at
http://www.edunetwork.com/reference/htmfa.keypart'html (last visited Feb. 2, 2001)
("Financial aid comes from four different sources: [t]he federal government, state governments,
numerous private sector entities, and the schools themselves." (emphasis added)).
3. See 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8) (1993 & Supp. 2000).
4. See Cazenovia Coll. v. Renshaw (In re Renshaw), 222 F.3d 82, 86 (2d Cir. 2000).
5. 11 U.S.C. § 523 (1993 & Supp. 2000) (providing a list of all debts that are exempt from
discharge).
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under this paragraph will impose an undue hardship on the
debtor and the debtor's dependents.'
The question then becomes what constitutes a loan for purposes of section
523(a)(8) of the Bankruptcy Code. Specifically, could an extension ofcreditby
an educational institution constitute a loan for purposes of this provision? For
example, suppose a student enrolls in college for the upcoming semester but is
unable to pay his tuition when it is due. Nonetheless, the college agrees to let
the student enroll and attend classes in exchange for a promise to pay the
tuition at a later date. At the end of the semester, the student fails to pay the
tuition and subsequently files for bankruptcy. Is this a loan for purposes of
section 523(a)(8) of the Bankruptcy Code?
Federal courts in South Carolina have yet to address the issue of whether
debts owed directly to a school for unpaid tuition and other expenses are within
the scope of section 523(a)(8) of the Bankruptcy Code. Federal courts in other
jurisdictions that have addressed the issue struggle with what the phrase
"educational benefit overpayment or loan" includes.7 Some jurisdictions
interpret this phrase narrowly to include only those transactions where money
actually changes hands, thus excluding extensions of credit.' Other
jurisdictions, however, interpret this phrase broadly to include any transaction
that confers on the debtor an educational benefit, thus including extensions of
credit.'
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals, in Cazenovia College v. Renshaw
(In re Renshaw), 0 rejected both the "actual money must change hands
approach" and the "educational benefit approach."" The Second Circuit held
that in order to constitute a loan for purposes of section 523(a)(8), there must
be a prior or contemporaneous contract, whereby one party transfers a defined
quantity of money, goods, or services to another, and the other agrees to pay
for that sum or items transferred at a later date. 2 The Second Circuit also found
that the phrase "educational benefit overpayment or loan" refers to a loan or
an educational benefit overpayment, as opposed to an educational benefit, an
educational overpayment, or an educational loan. 3
6. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8) (1993 & Supp. 2000) (emphasis added).
7. See cases cited infra notes 8-9.
8. See Johnson v. Va. Commonwealth Univ. (In re Johnson), 222 B.R. 783, 787 (Bankr.
E.D. Va. 1998); N.M. Inst. of Mining and Tech. v. Coole (In re Coole), 202 B.R. 518, 519
(Bankr. D.N.M. 1996); Dakota Wesleyan Univ. v. Nelson (In re Nelson), 188 B.R. 32, 34
(D.S.D. 1995). See generally United Res. Sys., Inc. v. Meinhart (In re Meinhart), 211 B.R. 750,
754-55 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1997) (citing In re Coole with approval).
9. Stone v. Vanderbilt Univ. (In re Stone), 180 B.R. 499, 502 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1995);
Stevens Inst. ofTech. v. Joyner (In re Joyner), 171 B.R. 762,763 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1994); Najafi
v. Cabrini Coll. (In re Najafi), 154 B.R 185, 190 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1993).
10. 222 F.3d 82 (2d Cir. 2000).
11.Id. at88.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 92 (emphasis added).
[Vol. 52: 795
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The purpose of this Comment is to advocate the approach adopted by the
Second Circuit in Renshaw by illustrating the weaknesses in the other
jurisdictions' approaches to this issue. Part II of this Comment reviews both
the legislative history and purpose of section 523, as well as the Renshaw
opinion. Part I discusses other jurisdictions' approaches to this issue and
highlights their differences and weaknesses. Part IV discusses the impact other
jurisdictions' approaches may have on a bankruptcy court in South Carolina if
this issue ever arises.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Legislative History and Purpose of Section 523(a)(8) of the
Bankruptcy Code
The fundamental purpose of our bankruptcy laws is to provide a debtor
with a fresh start in life. 4 Although our bankruptcy laws seek to provide a
debtor with a clean slate by discharging debts, Congress created exceptions to
the general rule of dischargeability because sometimes a creditor's interest in
recovering full payment of debts outweighs the debtor's interest in a fresh
start.15 Since bankruptcy laws favor dischargeability, it is well-established that
exceptions to discharge should be narrowly construed against the creditor and
in favor of the debtor.'6 However, courts "can construe the [exceptions] no
more narrowly than the language [of the statute] and legislative history
allow."
17
Congress created the Guaranteed Student Loan Program through the
adoption of the Higher Education Act of 1965."8 The program was designed to
combat the increased cost of post-high school education by insuring that
students lacking financial resources wouldbe able to continue their education."
Over the years, the program proved to be successful. 0 However, the program
also proved to be subject to abuse by students.2' Reports emerged about
increasing numbers of students discharging their educational obligations on the
14. See id. at 86; Andrews Univ. v. Merchant (In re Merchant), 958 F.2d 738, 740 (6th Cir.
1992); Johnson v. Va. Commonwealth Univ. (In re Johnson), 222 B.R. 783,785-86 (Bankr. E.D.
Va. 1998); Alibatya v. N.Y. Univ. (In re Alibatya), 178 B.R. 335,337 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1995).
15.SeeRenshaw, 222 F.3d at 86; Merchant, 958 F.2d at740;Alibatya, 178 B.R. at 337. The
Bankruptcy Code provides a list of the different categories of debts that are excepted from
discharge. See 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(l)-(a)(12) (1993 & Supp. 2000).
16. See Renshaw, 222 F.3d at 86; In re Pelkowski, 990 F.2d 737, 744 (3d Cir. 1993);
RooseveltUniv. v. Oldham (In re Oldham), 220 B.R. 607, 610 (Bankr. E.D. III. 1998);Alibatya,
178 B.R. at 337; Seton Hall Univ. v. Van Ess (In re Van Ess), 186 B.R. 375, 377-78 (Bankr.
D.N.J. 1994).
17. In re Pelkowski, 990 F.2d at 745; Alibatya, 178 B.R. at 338.
18. Pub. L. No. 89-329, 79 Stat. 1219 (1965).
19. S. REP. No. 89-673 (1965), reprinted in 1965 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4027,4053.
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eve of lucrative careers.' Congress, recognizing this abuse as a threat to the
continuance of the educational loan program,' adopted section 439A of the
Educational Amendments of 1976,4 which limited the dischargeability of
student loans.'
Under the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978,26 Congress repealed section
429A of the Educational Code and adopted section 523(a)(8) of the Bankruptcy
Code.' Section 523(a)(8), in its original form, provided:
(a) A discharge under section 727, 1141, or 1328(b) of this
title does not discharge an individual debtor from any debt-
(8) to a governmental unit, or a nonprofit institution of higher
education, for an educational loan, unless-
(A) such loan first became due before five years before
the date of the filing of the petition; or
22. H.R. Doc. No. 93-137 pt. 1, at 187 (1973).
23. Id. Courts have frequently discussed the "twin policy considerations"--preventing
abuse and safeguarding the financial integrity of the system-behind the adoption of this
exception. Seeln re Pelkowski, 990 F.2d 737,743 (3d Cir. 1993) (stating that "Congress enacted
11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8) in an effort to prevent abuses in and protect the solvency of the
educational loan programs"); Andrews Univ. v. Merchant (In re Merchant), 958 F.2d 738, 742
(6th Cir. 1992) (stating that "Congress enacted 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8) in an effort to prevent
abuses in and protect the solvency of the educational loan programs"); Johnson v. Va.
Commonwealth Univ. (In re Johnson), 222 B.R. 783,786 n.1 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1998) (providing
that "[c]ourts have focused on the twin policy considerations fundamental to this exclusion:
preventing abuse of the educational loan system and bankruptcy process ... ; and safeguarding
the financial integrity of the loan system as well as those participating government entities and
nonprofit institutions"); United Res. Sys. v. Meinhart (In re Meinhart), 211 B.R. 750, 754
(Bankr. D. Colo. 1997) (stating that "the exclusion of educational loans from the discharge
provisions was designed to remedy abuses of the educational loan system ... and to safeguard
the financial integrity of educational loan programs"); Seton Hall Univ. v. Van Ess (In re Van
Ess), 186 B.R. 375,378 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1994) (providing that "[the] expansion of[§ 523(a)(8)]
is completely consistent with the Congressional intent discerned by the Court in Pelkowski 'to
prevent abuses in and protect the solvency of the educational loan programs' (citations
omitted)).
24. Pub. L. No. 94-482, § 439A, 90 Stat. 2081, 2141 (1976) (repealed 1978).
25. Id. Section 439A(a) provided:
A debt which is a loan insured or guaranteed under the authority of this part
may be released by a discharge in bankruptcy under the Bankruptcy Act
only if such discharge is granted after the five-year period (exclusive of
any applicable suspension of the repayment period) beginning on the date
of commencement of the repayment period of such loan, except that prior
to the expiration of that five-year period, such loan may be released only
if the court in which the proceeding is pending determines that payment
from future income or other wealth will impose an undue hardship on the
debtor or his dependents.
Id.
26. Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (1978).
27. Id. at 2590-91.
[Vol. 52:795
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(B) excepting such debt from discharge under this
paragraph will impose an undue hardship on the debtor
and the debtor's dependents....
This section, as adopted under the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, basically
paralleled section 429A of the Educational Code.29
Section 523(a)(8) has been amended several times since its adoption under
the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978.30 Congress first amended section
523(a)(8) in 1979 in order to provide for equal treatment of student loans
administered by nonprofit and profit-making institutions of higher education.3"
The amendment struck out the phrase "to a governmental unit, or a nonprofit
institution of higher education, for an educational loan" and replaced it with
the phrase "for an educational loan made, insured, or guaranteed by a
governmental unit, or made under any program funded in whole or in part by
a governmental unit or a nonprofit institution of higher education. '32 The
amendment also changed subparagraph (A) by adding the phrase "exclusive of
any applicable suspension of the repayment period" after the phrase "before
five years."'33 In 1984, Congress expanded section 523(a)(8) to apply to loans
made under a program funded by any nonprofit institution, as opposed to just
nonprofit institutions of higher learning.34 The 1990 amendment expanded
section 523(a)(8) to cover "educational benefit overpayment[s]" as well as
"obligation[s] to repay funds received as educational benefit[s],
scholarship[s], or stipend[s]. "'3 The amendment also increased the coverage
period in subparagraph (A) from five years to seven years.36 In 1998, however,
Congress deleted section 523(a)(8)(A), leaving undue hardship as the only
28. Id.
29. Pub. L. No. 94-482, § 439A, 90 Stat. 2081, 2141 (1976) (repealed 1978).
30. See Pub. L. No. 96-56,93 Stat. 387 (1979); Pub. L. No. 98-353, 98 Stat. 376 (1984);
Pub. L. No. 101-647,104 Stat. 4933,4964-65 (1990); Pub. L. No. 105-244,112 Stat. 1581, 1837
(1998).
31. Pub. L. No. 96-56, 93 Stat. 387 (1979); S. REP. No. 96-230 (1979), reprinted in 1979
U.S.C.C.A.N. 936. The report recognized that section 523(a)(8), as adopted by the Bankruptcy
Reform Act of 1978, had a very uneven effect upon the student loan programs administered by
the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare. Id. at 936.
For example, National Direct Student Loan (NDSL) funds are administered
by both nonprofit and profit-making institutions ofhigher education. Under
[the current version], a student who obtained an NDSL loan from a profit-
making institution of higher education would be free to have that loan
discharged in bankruptcy. In contrast, a student who obtained an NDSL
loan from a nonprofit institution of higher education would be subject to
the prohibitions contained in the [current version].
Id. at 936-37.
32. Pub. L. No. 96-56, 93 Stat. 387 (1979) (emphasis added).
33. Id. (emphasis added).
34. Pub. L. No. 98-353, 98 Stat. 376 (1984).
35. Pub. L. No. 101-647, 104 Stat. 4933, 4964-65 (1990) (emphasis added).
36. Id. at 4965.
2001]
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basis for discharging an educational loan or benefit covered under section
523(a)(8).
3 7
B. Cazenovia College v. Renshaw
In Cazenovia College v. Renshaw (In re Renshaw),8 the Second Circuit
Court of Appeals consolidated an appeal from the United States Bankruptcy
Appellate Panel for the Second Circuie9 and an appeal from the United States
District Court for the Northern District of New York.' Kevin Renshaw
("Renshaw") and David W. Regner ("Regner"), the debtors, failed to pay
college tuition when due, yet both Cazenovia College ("Cazenovia") and the
College of Saint Rose ("St. Rose") respectively, permitted them to attend
classes anyway." Cazenovia and St. Rose contended that by permitting the
debtors to attend classes, they extended to the debtors educational loans exempt
from discharge in bankruptcy.42 Alternatively, Cazenovia contended that
Renshaw's class attendance constituted an educational benefit subject to
exemption from discharge in bankruptcy.' Both of the lower courts found in
favor of the debtors and held that the colleges' extension of credit did not fall
within the scope of section 523(a)(8) of the Bankruptcy Code.'
In the Cazenovia case, Renshaw signed a "Reservation Agreement"before
attending classes.45 In return for signing the "Reservation Agreement,"
Cazenovia agreed to hold open a place for Renshaw, provided that he would
pay the amounts due when billed." The "Reservation Agreement" required
Renshaw to pay a $285 reservation fee, tuition, room, and board and to be
bound by various payment-related provisions in the agreement. Renshaw
failed to pay Cazenovia's charges when due, yet Cazenovia allowed him to
register, live in college housing, eat his meals, and attend classes for the 1992
Summer and Fall terms." For both terms, Renshaw owed Cazenovia $5,027.16,
which included applicable service charges.49
37. Pub. L. No. 105-244, 112 Stat. 1581, 1837 (1998).
38. 222 F.3d 82 (2d Cir. 2000).
39. Cazenovia Coll. v. Renshaw (In re Renshaw), 229 B.R. 552 (B.A.P. 2d Cir. 1999).
40. CoIl. of Saint Rose v. Regner (In re Regner), 229 B.R. 270 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 1999).




45. Id. at 84-85. Cazenovia required all incoming students to sign identical agreements. Id.
46.Id. at 85.
47. Renshaw, 222 F.3d at 85. These provisions included an obligation to pay a service
charge with an effective annual interest rate of 19.2% if payments were not made by their due
date. Id.
48.Id.
49.Id. Before Renshaw filed forbankruptcy under Chapter 7, Cazenovia sued and obtained
a defaultjudgment against him in the amount of $9,999.87. Id. This amount included $3,169.99
in accrued service charges, plus an award of attorney's fees of $1,339.18. Id.
[Vol. 52: 795
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In the St. Rose case, Regner paid his tuition through financial aid until he
enrolled for the 1993 Fall term.50 St. Rose permitted Regner to attend classes
that semester without fully paying his tuition."' On April 20, 1994, after
realizing that Regner failed to pay his tuition for the 1993 Fall semester, St.
Rose mailed Regner a letter asking him to contact the College's business office
about his past due balance. 2 Regner acknowledged his obligation to St. Rose
and made some payments, but failed to pay his tuition bill in full.53
As to the first issue of whether or not the colleges' extensions of credit
qualified as loans under section 523(a)(8) of the Bankruptcy Code, the Second
Circuit recognized that Congress did not define the term "loan" in section
523(a)(8). 4 Therefore, the court relied on the common law definition of a loan
articulated in the classic case of In re Grand Union Co.5s Based on this
definition, the court held that for the credit extension "[t]o constitute a loan,
there must be (i) a contract, whereby (ii) one party transfers a defined quantity
of money, goods, or services, to another, and (iii) the other agrees to pay for the
sum or items transferred at a later date."' 6 The court reasoned that this
definition implies that the contract to transfer items in return for later payment
must be reached prior to or contemporaneous with the transfer.5 7 According to
the court, when determining whether a transaction is a loan, the focus should
be on the intent of the parties, not the form of the transaction. 8 Absent a prior
or contemporaneous agreement, failure to pay a bill when due does not create
a loan.59
The court held that the transactions (extensions of credit) in both cases
failed to meet the definition of a loan as articulated byIn re Grand Union Co.'
50. Id. at 85.
51. Id.
52.Id.
53. Renshaw, 222 F.3d at 85. St. Rose obtained a default judgment against Regner, after he
stipulated that he owed St. Rose $4,445.32 in tuition cost, not including interest. Id. Regner
thereafter filed for bankruptcy under Chapter 7. Id.
54. Id. at 88.
55. Id. (citing In re Grand Union Co., 219 F. 353, 356 (2d Cir. 1914)). The Second Circuit
Court of Appeals in In re Grand Union Co. defined a loan as follows:
A loan of money is a contract by which one delivers a sum of money
to another and the latter agrees to return at a future time a sum equivalent
to that which he borrows.
"In order to constitute a loan there must be a contract whereby, in
substance one party transfers to the other a sum of money which that other
agrees to repay absolutely, together with such additional sums as may be
agreed upon for its use. If such be the intent of the parties, the transaction
will be considered a loan without regard to its form."
In re Grand Union Co., 219 F. at 356 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
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Specifically, the court found that neither college entered into a prior or
contemporaneous agreement to extend credit to the debtors or to permit the
debtors to attend classes in return for a payment of tuition at a future date.6
Cazenovia tried to argue that the Reservation Agreement signed by
Renshaw evidenced a prior or contemporaneous agreement.62 The court
rejected this argument and concluded that the only purpose of that agreement
was to notify Renshaw of the college's fees and to obligate him to pay those
fees even if he stopped attending classes.63 According to the court, the
agreement was not an obligation to permit Renshaw to attend classes or to
obtain other services from the college without paying his bills, nor was it a
promise to extend such credit to him."
Similarly, St. Rose tried to argue that Regner agreed, in response to the
college's demands, that he owed them money.65 The court rejected this
argument because the parties did not agree, prior to or contemporaneous with
Regner's attendance, that the college would provide him with educational
services that he would pay for later.' The agreement was entered into in 1994,
well after Regner's attendance during the 1993 Fall semester.67
As to the second issue, the court rejected Cazenovia's contention that
Renshaw's class attendance constituted an "educational benefit" exempt from
discharge.68 Cazenovia urged the court to follow other jurisdictions and
interpret the phrase "educational benefit overpayment or loan" as including an
educational benefit, an educational overpayment, or an educational loan.69 The
court, based on rules of common English, found that the phrase refers to a loan
or an educational benefit overpayment.'
M. ANALYsis
Courts recognize that neither section 523(a)(8) nor any other section of the
Bankruptcy Code defines the term loan.7 Therefore, courts must infer what
Congress intended the term to encompass by looking at its established
61.Id.
62. Renshaw, 222 F.3d at 88.
63. Id. at 88-89.
64. Id. at 89. The court also found relevant to their conclusion evidence such as the fact that
such agreements were entered into without making any inquiry into students' financial needs,
creditworthiness, or intent to pay the college's fees on time, as well as fact that the 19.2% annual




68. Renshaw, 222 F.3d at 92.
69. Id. (emphasis added).
70. Id.
71. Id. at 88; Roosevelt Univ. v. Oldham (In re Oldham), 220 B.R. 607, 612 (Bankr. E.D.
II1. 1998); Andrews Univ. v. Merchant (In re Merchant), 958 F.2d 738, 740 (6th Cir. 1992).
[Vol. 52: 795
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72meaning. Most courts rely on the common law definition of a loan articulated
in In re Grand Union Co.71 to determine if a particular transaction constitutes
a loan for purposes of section 523(a)(8) of the Bankruptcy Code.74 Based on
this definition, some jurisdictions apply approaches similar to the Second
Circuit's approach in Renshaw and look for some form of agreement between
the parties acknowledging the debt owed, whether or not money actually
changed hands.7' By contrast, other jurisdictions require money to actually
change hands before a transaction can constitute a loan.76 There are a few
jurisdictions, however, that hold that any educational benefit conferred on a
debtor is subject to section 523(a)(8) of the Bankruptcy Code.77
A. Similar Approaches
Those courts that have adopted approaches similar to the Second Circuit's
approach in Renshaw hold that in order for an extension of credit to constitute
a loan, the following requirements must be met: (1) the student was aware of
the credit extension and acknowledged the money owed; (2) the amount owed
was liquidated; and (3) the extended credit was defined as a sum of money due
to a person.7 s Courts utilizing this approach adhere to the view that the
substance of the debt and the reason for which it is being incurred should
control over the form in which the debt was created and structured.79 Therefore,
if an educational institution extends credit to a student for educational purposes,
and the extension of credit meets the three requirements set out above, then the
72. Merchant, 958 F.2d at 740.
73.219 F. 353, 356 (2d Cir. 1914); see supra note 55 (quoting the In re Grand Union Co.
definition of a loan).
74. See Renshaw, 222 F.3d at 88; Merchant, 958 F.2d at 741; Johnson v. Mo. Baptist Coll.
(In re Johnson), 218 B.R. 449, 455 (B.A.P. 8th Cir. 1998); Johnson v. Va. Commonwealth Univ.
(In re Johnson), 222 B.R. 783, 787 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1998); N.M. Inst. of Mining and Tech. v.
Coole (In re Coole), 202 B.R. 518, 519 (Bankr. D.N.M. 1996); Alibatya v. N.Y. Univ. (In re
Alibatya), 178 B.R. 335, 338-39 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1995); U.S. Dep't of Health and Human
Servs. v. Avila (In re Avila), 53 B.R. 933, 936 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 1985).
75. Merchant, 958 F.2d at 741; Oldham, 220 B.R. at 612-13; Stone v. Vanderbilt Univ. (In
re Stone), 180 B.R. 499,501-02 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1995); Univ. of N.H. v. Hill (In re Hill), 44
B.R. 645, 647 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1984).
76. Johnson, 222 B.R. at 787; Coole, 202 B.R. at 519; Dakota Wesleyan Univ. v. Nelson
(In re Nelson), 188 B.R. 32, 34 (D.S.D. 1995). See generally United Res. Sys., Inc. v. Meinhart
(In re Meinhart), 211 B.R. 750, 754-55 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1997) (citing In re Coole with
approval).
77. Stone, 180 B.R. at 502; Stevens Inst. of Tech. v. Joyner (In re Joyner), 171 B.R. 762,
763 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1994); Najafi v. Cabrini Coll. (In reNajafi),154B.R. 185,190 (Bankr. E.D.
Pa. 1993).
78. Merchant, 958 F.2d at 741; Stone, 180 B.R. at 501; see also Hill, 44 B.R. at 647
(holding that the college's extension of credit constituted a loan because the debtor was aware
of and acknowledged that he was extended credit to be paid as soon as he received the proceeds
of his student loan); Oldham, 220 B.R. at 612-13 (applying the same factors as Hill and
Merchant).
79. Oldham, 220 B.R. at 613.
2001]
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extension of credit will constitute a loan for purposes of section 523(a)(8) of
the Bankruptcy Code.80
Like Renshaw, these courts hold that absent some form of agreement or
acknowledgment, an extension of credit does not ripen into a loan for purposes
of section 523(a)(8) of the Bankruptcy Code. In Andrews University v.
Merchant (In reMerchant), the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit relied on
the debtor's signed promissory note acknowledging her debt to find that the
University's extension of credit for educational expenses fell within the scope
of section 523(a)(8) of the Bankruptcy Code."1 Although a promissory note is
a good indicator of an agreement, it is not the only way to show that the parties
entered into a contract.8 2 In University of New Hampshire v. Hill (In re Hill),
the Bankruptcy Court for the District of Massachusetts found that an oral
agreement was sufficient to satisfy this requirement.83
The only major difference between the approach used by these courts and
the approach adopted by the Second Circuit in Renshaw is that these courts do
not require that there be an agreement or acknowledgment prior to or
contemporaneous with the extension of credit." Although these courts do not
appear to specifically require a prior to or contemporaneous agreement or
acknowledgment, most of the cases indicate that the agreement or
acknowledgment occurred prior to or contemporaneous with the extension of
credit.85
80. Merchant, 958 F.2d at 741; Oldham, 220 B.R. at 612-13; Stone, 180 B.R. at 501-02;
Hill, 44 B.R. at 647.
81. Merchant, 958 F.2d at 741; see also Oldham, 220 B.R. at 613 (holding that the debt was
for a liquidated total and for a definite sum of money representing the unpaid tuition as provided
in the promissory notes); Stone, 180 B.R. at 502 (holding that there was a loan because the
amount claimed is liquidated and the note proves an amount due Vanderbilt).
82. See Hill, 44 B.R. at 647 (allowing an oral agreement to satisfy requirements of a
contract).
83. Id. While attempting to register, Mr. Hill was told that he could not complete
registration because his tuition was unpaid. Id. at 646. After conferring with his hockey coach
and the school business manager, Mr. Hill was permitted to register and had thirty days to satisfy
his tuition. Id. Although Mr. Hill did not sign any form of an agreement, the court found that the
University, in effect, provided Mr. Hill with short term credit pending receipt of his loan
proceeds. Id.
84. Merchant, 958 F.2d at 741; Stone, 180 B.R. at 501; see also Hill, 44 B.R. at 647
(holding that the college's extension of credit constituted a loan because the debtor was aware
of and acknowledged that he was extended credit to be paid as soon as he received the proceeds
of his student loan); Oldham, 220 B.R. at 612-13 (applying the same factors as Hill and
Merchant).
85. See Oldham, 220 B.R. at 609 (noting that debtor signed promissory note promising to
pay total cost of tuition at time of registration); Hill, 44 B.R. at 646 (finding that an oral
agreement was entered into before the debtor was permitted to register for classes). But see
Stone, 180 B.R. at 500 (holding that there was a loan, even though debtor signed promissory note
after she withdrew from school). In Renshaw the Second Circuit found that it was not entirely
clear from the Merchant opinion if the promissory notes were entered into prior to or
contemporaneous with the extension of credit. Cazenovia Coll. v. Renshaw (In re Renshaw), 222
F.3d 82, 91 (2d Cir. 2000). However, in Merchant the Sixth Circuit specifically stated in its
10
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The distinction between the approach adopted by Renshaw and the similar
approach adopted by these other jurisdictions may prove detrimental to the
debtor. If these jurisdictions do not require a prior or contemporaneous
agreement or acknowledgment, the debtor conceivably could turn an otherwise
dischargeable debt into a nondischargeable debt by acknowledging the debt at
a later time. For example, the debtor could turn a dischargeable debt into a
nondischargeable debt by either stipulating to the debt in ajudicial proceeding
or acknowledging the debt orally or in writing after the debtor finished school.
If this is true, then debtors in these jurisdictions have an incentive to deny ever
being aware of the credit extension and the debt. 6 However, in this situation
both approaches would render the same result. The debt would be
dischargeable by either a lack of a prior or contemporaneous contract or a lack
of awareness and acknowledgment of the debt.
To the extent that these jurisdictions do not require a prior or
contemporaneous agreement or acknowledgment, their approach provides no
protection to the debtor as it construes section 523(a)(8) of the Bankruptcy
Code in favor of the creditor. These jurisdictions seem to ignore the well-
established principle that exceptions to discharge should be narrowly construed
against the creditor and in favor of the debtor."' It is also well-settled that courts
can construe the exception no more narrowly than the statute's language and
legislative history will allow.88 Congress limited this exception to cover loans. 9
However, in the situation where an educational institution allows a student to
attend class without paying tuition, absent any form of agreement or
acknowledgment, a loan was not created, and there is no creditor/debtor
relationship between the educational institution and the student. To allow an
educational instituion to approach the student well after the period in which the
credit was extended and create a loan where one did not exist before would be
contrary to the principles of construction mentioned above. The educational
institution had ample time to secure a creditor/debtor relationship with the
student during the period in which the institution extended credit to the student.
holding that the debtor signed forms evidencing the amount of indebtedness before she registered
for classes. Merchant, 958 F.2d at 741. Nevertheless, the Second Circuit indicated its agreement
with Merchant to the extent that the debtor signed the promissory note prior to or
contemporaneous with the extension of credit. Renshaw, 222 F.3d at 91-92.
86. Ihis incentive will really only exist after the debtor finishes school. If at the time the
debtor receives the credit extension, the debtor were to either deny that it was a credit extension
or fail to acknowledge the debt, then more likely than not, the educational institution would not
permit the debtor to enroll or attend classes. However, if the educational institution were to
allow the debtor to enroll and attend classes anyway, then the educational institution deserves
to be subject to the debtor's incentive to lie.
87. See Renshaw, 222 F.3d at 86; In re Pelkowski, 990 F.2d 737, 744 (3d Cir. 1993);
Oldham, 220 B.R. at 610; Alibatya v. N.Y. Univ. (In re Alibatya), 178 B.R. 335, 337 (Bankr.
E.D.N.Y. 1995); Seton Hall Univ. v. Van Ess (In re Van Ess), 186 B.R. 375, 377-78 (Bankr.
D.N.J. 1994).
88. In re Pelkowski, 990 F.2d 737, 745 (3d Cir. 1993); Alibatya, 178 B.R. at 338.
89. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8) (1993 & Supp. 2000).
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An educational institution that allows a student to attend classes without paying
tuition, and without an agreement or acknowledgment to pay the tuition at a
later time, should not be able to subsequently create a loan where one did not
exist before in order to invoke the protection of section 523(a)(8) of the
Bankruptcy Code.
B. Sum ofMoney Approach
While some courts follow Renshaw and allow the institution to create a
loan ex post facto if certain factors are met, other courts use a different
approach. Courts following the "sum of money" approach hold that there must
be an actual exchange of money before a transaction can constitute a loan under
section 523(a)(8) of the Bankruptcy Code.90 These courts rely on the "plain"
or "common sense" meaning of the word loan.9' In New Mexico Institute of
Mining and Technology v. Coole (In re Coole), the Bankruptcy Court for the
District of New Mexico relied on both the dictionary definition of a loan found
in Black's Law Dictionarye and the definition of a loan articulated in In re
Grand Union Co.93 Both of these definitions contain the phrase "sum of
money."'94 Based on these definitions, the court in Coole held that the plain
meaning of the term "loan" is that a sum of money must change hands.9' The
court reasoned that although Congress expressed a strong policy of excepting
student obligations from discharge, "Congress did not intend to make every
student obligation nondischargeable. 96 The court said, "A line has to be drawn.
The line was drawn at the word 'loan."' 97 Therefore, an extension of credit
90. Johnson v. Va. Commonwealth Univ. (In re Johnson), 222 B.R. 783,787 (Bankr. E.D.
Va. 1998); N.M. Inst. of Mining and Tech. v. Coole (In re Coole), 202 B.R. 518, 519 (Bankr.
D.N.M. 1996); DakotaWesleyan Univ. v. Nelson (In re Nelson), 188 B.R. 32,34 (D.S.D. 1995).
See generally United Res. Sys., Inc. v. Meinhart (In re Meinhart), 211 B.R. 750,754 (Bankr. D.
Colo. 1997) (citing In re Coole with approval).
91. Johnson, 222 B.R. at 787; Coole, 202 B.R. at 519.
92. Coole, 202 B.t. at 519 (citing BLACK'S LAW DICIONARY 936 (6th ed. 1990)). The
Court in Coole cited the following definition from Black's Law Dictionary: "A Lending.
Delivery by one party to and receipt by another party of sum ofmoney upon agreement, express
or implied, to repay it with or without interest."' Coole, 202 B.R. at 519 (emphasis added). The
Second Circuit in In re Grand Union Co. defined a loan of money as "a contract by which one
delivers a sum of money to another and the latter agrees to return at a future time a sum
equivalent to that which he borrows." In re Grand Union Co., 219 F. 353, 356 (2d Cir. 1914)
(emphasis added).
93. Id. at 356.
94. Coole, 202 B.IL at 519.
95. Id. The court also specifically rejected the reasoning inMerchant because it ignored the
fact that no money had changed hands. Id.; see also Johnson, 222 B.R. at 787 (finding the
narrow approach to defining a loan more persuasive because the definitions cited indicate a sum
of money must change hands).
96. Coole, 202 B.R. at 519 ("[T]he policy expressed by Congress cannot be used as a
catchall which overlooks the specific wording of the statute, thereby sweeping all student
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under this approach can never amount to a loan for purposes of section 523 of
the Bankruptcy Code.98
The sum of money approach that the Coole court and other courts adopted
is flawed for several reasons. First, the courts' reliance on the definition of a
loan articulated by the Second Circuit in In re Grand Union Co. is misdirected.
These courts seem only to rely on the Second Circuit's definition of a "loan of
money." The Second Circuit defined a "loan of money" as "'a contract by
which one delivers a sum of money to another and the latter agrees to return at
a future time a sum equivalent to that which he borrows.""' However, the
Second Circuit defined a"loan" as a "'contract whereby, in substance one party
transfers to the other a sum of money which that other agrees to repay
absolutely, together with such additional sums as may be agreed upon for its
use. ' '' ' ® The Second Circuit further stated that "'[i]f such be the intent of the
parties, the transaction will be considered a loan without regard to its form.'"O'
This broad definition of a loan focuses on the substance and the intent of the
transaction, as opposed to its form. 2 By reading this definition as a whole, it
is clear that a contract to extend credit fits within the scope of the Second
Circuit's definition of a loan.
The courts that interpret the definition of a loan narrowly ignore the fact
that an extension of credit is in substance a transfer of a sum of money. There
is little difference between a transaction where an educational institution agrees
to extend credit to a student for the cost of tuition and a transaction where an
educational institution agrees to actually give the student money to pay the
tuition. The latter only adds one more step to the substance of the transaction.
The former just bypasses the step where the educational institution writes a
check to the student and the student turns around and writes a check back to the
educational institution. Both transactions, in substance, create a debt to the
educational institution."
98. See id.
99. In re Grand Union Co., 219 F. at 356 (emphasis added).
100. Id. (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
101. Id.
102. Id.; see also Roosevelt Univ. v. Oldham (In re Oldham), 220 B.R. 607, 613 (Bankr.
E.D. Ill. 1998) (holding that the substance of the debt and what it was incurred for should control
rather than the form in which the debt is created or structured); U.S. Dep't of Health and Human
Se-vs. v. Avila (In re Avila), 53 B.R. 933, 936 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 1985) (stating that a loan may
exist regardless of its form).
103. An example of the two options illustrates this point. Suppose the cost of tuition for the
upcoming semester is $3,000. At the beginning of the semester the student has an open tuition
account with a balance due of $3,000. Under the first option, the educational institution agrees
to give the student $3,000 to pay his tuition in return for the student's promise to pay it back at
a later date. The educational institution writes the student a check for $3,000 out of its cash
account, thus creating a debt obligation of $3,000. The student then writes a check back to the
educational institution for $3,000 to pay off the balance in the student's open tuition account.
Under the second approach, the educational institution agrees to extend credit to the student for
the cost of tuition in return for the student's promise to pay it back at a later time. The
educational institution then transfers money out of its cash account to the student's open tuition
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Another flaw in the approach adopted by these courts is that the Black's
Law Dictionary definition the courts rely on is not the only definition of a loan.
As the courts inRoosevelt University v. Oldham (In re Oldham), " DePasquale
v. Boston University School ofDentistry (In re DePasquale),'5 and Johnson v.
Missouri Baptist College (In re Johnson)"° recognized, Black's Law
Dictionary and other dictionaries contain many different definitions of a
loan."07 The definition of a loan in Black's Law Dictionary following the
definition these courts used provides that a loan is "[a]nything furnished for
temporary use to a person at his request, on condition that it shall be returned,
or its equivalent in kind, with or without compensation for its use."' 8 Black's
Law Dictionary also defines a loan as "[a] borrowing of money or other
personal property by a person who promises to return it."'09 Relying on these
definitions, the Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Illinois, in
Oldham, found that it defied common sense, as well as the frequent use of the
term, to merely confine a loan to cash or money transactions." 0 "If one can
'loan' a tangible piece of property to someone, such as a tool, car or the like,
one can 'loan' intangible things such as credit for unpaid tuition."'
Another definition found in Black's Law Dictionary further defines a loan
as "the creation of debt by a credit to an account with the lender upon which
the debtor is entitled to draw immediately.""... The Bankruptcy Appellate Panel
for the Eighth Circuit, in Johnson, found that an educational institution's
extension of credit to a student is, in effect, a credit to the student's account
upon which the student is entitled to draw immediately."' The student draws
on these accounts through immediate class attendance." 4
account to satisfy thebalance due, thus creating a debt obligation of $3,000. Underboth options,
the educational institution had to reduce its cash account in order to satisfy the student's open
tuition account.
104. Oldham, 220 B.R. at 612.
105. 225 B.R. 830, 832 (B.A.P. 1st Cir. 1998).
106.218 B.R. 449,456 (B.A.P. 8th Cir. 1998).
107. Oldham, 220 B.R. at 612; DePasquale, 225 B.R. at 832; Johnson, 218 B.R. at 256.
108. BLACK'SLAWDICInONARY 936 (6th ed. 1990);see also BLACK'sLAWDICTIONARY 947
(7th ed. 1999) (defining a loan as a thing lent for the borrower's temporary use); MERRIAM
WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICrIONARY 683 (10th ed. 1993) (defining a loan as a thing lent for the
borrower's temporary use); WEsT'sLEGALTHEsAuRus/DIcmoNARY464 (1985) (defining a loan
as anything furnished for temporary use with or without compensation on the condition that it
or its equivalent in kind be returned).
109. BLAcK's LAW DICrIONARY 936 (6th ed. 1990).
110. Oldham, 220 B.R. at 612; see also DePasquale, 225 B.R. at 832 (quoting Oldham).
111. Oldham, 220 B.1. at 612; see also DePasquale, 225 B.R. at 832 (quoting Oldham).
112. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 936 (6th ed. 1990); see also WEsT'S LEGAL
TIESAURUS/DICTIONARY 464 (1985) (including a "credit" among its definitions of a loan);
BURTON's LEGAL THESAURUS 340, 341 (3d ed. 1998) (including a credit among its definitions
of a loan).
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By applying section 523(a)(8) to only those transactions where money
actually changes hands, these courts ignore the well-established principles in
construing exceptions to dischargeability."' Although courts are to construe
exceptions to discharge narrowly against the creditor and in favor of the
debtor,"6 they can construe the exceptions no more narrowly than the language
of the statute and the legislative history allow."7 Based on all the definitions
mentioned above, a loan can easily encompass an extension of credit by an
educational institution."' As the court in Johnson recognized, the "common
sense" or "plain" meaning approach adopted by these courts "overlooks the
realities of most commercial transactions in which money, in its most concrete
manifestation, never actually changes hands."' 9 Under this approach, "only the
most mechanical transactions will constitute a loan."' 0 The reality of this so
called "common sense" or "plain" meaning approach adopted by these courts
is that the courts fail to recognize the common sense or plain meaning of the
word "loan." By doing so, they have construed section 523(a)(8) of the
Bankruptcy Code completely in favor of the debtor, ignoring both the purpose
of the exception, as articulated in the legislative history, and the actual meaning
of the term "loan."
C. Educational Benefit Approach
In addition to the factor test used in Renshaw and the sum of money
approach, courts have used a third method to determine whether an extension
of educational credit is a loan. Courts following the "educational benefit
approach," although few in number, broaden the scope of section 523(a)(8) of
the Bankruptcy Code to cover any transaction that confers on the debtor an
educational benefit.'2' The approach centers around the statutory construction
of the phrase "educational benefit overpayment or loan" contained within
section 523(a)(8) of the Bankruptcy Code.'2 The Bankruptcy Court for the
Eastern District of Pennsylvania, undoubtedly the strongest advocate of this
approach, found that the absence of commas makes this phrase difficult to
115. See Cazenovia Coll. v. Renshaw (In re Renshaw), 222 F.3d 82,86 (2d Cir. 2000); In
re Pelkowski, 990 F.2d 737,744-45 (3d Cir. 1993); Oldham, 220 B.R. at 610; Alibatya v. N.Y.
Univ. (In re Alibatya), 178 B.R. 335,337-38 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1995); Seton Hall Univ. v. Van
Ess (In re Van Ess), 186 B.R. 375, 377-78 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1994).
116. See Renshaw, 222 F.3d at 86; In re Pelkowski, 990 F.2d at 744; Oldham, 220 B.R. at
610; Alibatya, 178 B.R. at 337; Van Ess, 186 B.R. at 377-78.
117. In re Pelkowski, 990 F.2d at 745; Alibatya, 178 B.R. at 338.
118. See Johnson, 218 B.R. at 457.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Stone v. Vanderbilt Univ. (In re Stone), 180 B.R. 499, 501-02 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn.
1995); Stevens Inst. of Tech. v. Joyner (In re Joyner), 171 B.R. 762,763 (Bankr. E.D:Pa. 1994);
Najafi v. Cabrini Coll. (In re Najafi), 154 B.R. 185, 190 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1993).
122. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8) (1993 & Supp. 2000).
20011
15
McQueen: In Re Renshaw: "Extensions of Credit" by an Educational Instituti
Published by Scholar Commons, 2020
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
interpret." In adopting an overly-broad interpretation of this phrase, the court
believed that the terms "benefit," "overpayment," and "loan" should be
construed as a series of nouns, all modified by the term "educational.' 2 4
Therefore, under this approach, any educational benefit, educational
overpayment, or educational loan would be exempt from discharge in a
bankruptcy proceeding." The court felt that there was no logical reason for
linking the terms "benefit" and "overpayment" together so that the phrase only
includes loans or educational benefit overpayments. 2 6 However, the court
noted that even if the phrase only referred to loans or educational benefit
overpayments, extensions of credit by an educational institution would still fall
under the purview ofan educational benefit overpayment.127 The court reasoned
that "[i]f anything could logically be termed as an 'educational benefit
overpayment,' it wouldbe an instance where a student received an educational
benefit which was in excess of that for which the student paid."'
28
A number of courts disagree with the Eastern District of Pennsylvania's
approach to the interpretation of the phrase "educational benefit overpayment
or loan.' '129 In Renshaw, the Second Circuit best highlighted the flawed
reasoning of this approach. 3' Relying on rules of common English usage, the
Second Circuit found that when Congress wishes to indicate that a series of
items is a set of alternatives, they consistently separate the items by commas
and use the word "or" before the last item."'3 The Second Circuit illustrated this
point by highlighting specific phrases within section 523(a)(8) where Congress
had employed this method:
(8) for an educational benefit overpayment or loan made,
insured orguaranteedby a governmental unit, or made under
any program funded in whole or in part by a governmental
unit or nonprofit institution, or for an obligation to repay
funds received as an educational benefit, scholarship or
123. Joyner, 171 B.R. at 763; Najafi, 154 B.R. at 190.
124. Joyner, 171 B.R. at 763; Najafi, 154 B.R. at 190; see also Stone, 180 B.R. at 501-02
n.5 (citing Najafi with approval).
125. SeeJoyner, 171 B.R. at 763; Najafi, 154 B.R. at 190; see also Stone, 180 B.R. at 501-
02 n.5 (citing Najafi with approval).
126. Najafi, 154 B.R. at 190.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. See Cazenovia Coll. v. Renshaw (In re Renshaw), 222 F.3d 82, 92 (2d Cir. 2000)
(holding that although this approach is ingenious, it is unpersuasive); Dakota Wesleyan Univ.
v. Nelson (In re Nelson), 188 B.R. 32, 34 (finding that the court in Stone adopted the flawed and
unsupportable construction of section 523(a)(8) set out in Najafi); Seton Hall Univ. v. Van Ess
(In re Van Ess), 186 B.R. 375, 380 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1994) (holding that the reading of the clause
proposed by the court in Najafi is strained and contrary to not only its plain language, but also
the legislative history).
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stipend, unless excepting such debt from discharge under this
paragraph will impose an undue hardship on the debtor and
the debtor's dependents.
32
The Second Circuit stated that if Congress meant for the phrase to include
"educational benefits or educational overpayments or educational loans," then
the statute would read "educational benefits, overpayments or loans.' 33 The
Second Circuit also found compelling the fact that the language "educational
benefit overpayment" was not added to the statute until the 1990 amendment.
1 4
The proper or sensible reading of the phrase is that it includes a loan or an
educational benefit overpayment.' 35
A second flaw in the reasoning of the Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania is that an educational benefit overpayment would
include an extension of credit by an educational institution. An "educational
benefit overpayment" is an overpayment from a program such as the GI Bill,
where a student receives periodic payments while the student is enrolled in
school." When a student receives these periodic payments but is not enrolled
in school as the program requires, an educational benefit overpayment
occurs.3 7 An extension of credit fails to meet this definition because the student
never receives periodic payments.
The courts utilizing this approach interpret section 523(a)(8) too broadly
and construe it to completely favor creditors, thus ignoring the well-established
principles of construction mentioned above.' Not only is this approach
contrary to the abundance of authority, but it is fundamentally unsound.
IV. IMPACT IN SOUTH CAROLINA
As mentioned earlier, federal courts in South Carolina have yet to address
the issue of whether debts owed directly to a school for unpaid tuition and other
132. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8) (1993 & Supp. 2000) (emphasis added).
133. See Renshaw, 222 F.3d at 92.
134. Id.; see Pub. L. No. 101-647, 104 Stat. 4933,4964 (1990).
135. Renshaw, 222 F.3d at 92; Nelson, 188 B.R. at 33; Van Ess, 186 B.R. at 380.
136. Cazenovia Coll. v. Renshaw (In re Renshaw), 229 B.R. 552,556 n.8 (B.A.P. 2d Cir.
1999); Coll. of Saint Rose v. Regner (In re Regner), 229 B.R. 270,271 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 1999);
Johnson v. Va. Commonwealth Univ. (In re Johnson), 222 B.R. 783, 786 (Bankr. E.D. Va.
1998); N.M. Inst. of Mining and Tech v. Coole (In re Coole), 202 B.R. 518,519 (Bankr. D.N.M.
1996); Alibatya v. N.Y. Univ. (In re Alibatya), 178 B.R. 335, 338 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1995).
137. Renshaw, 229 B.R. at 556 n.8; Regner, 229 B.R. at 271; Johnson, 222 B.R. at 786;
Coole, 202 B.R. at 519; Alibatya, 178 B.R. at 338.
138. Exceptions to discharge should be narrowly construed against the creditor and in favor
of the debtor. See Renshaw, 222 F.3d at 86; In re Pelkowski, 990 F.2d 737,744 (3d Cir. 1993);
Roosevelt Univ. v. Oldham (In re Oldham), 220 B.R. 607,610 (Bankr. E.D. Ill. 1998); Alibatya,
178 B.R. at 337; Van Ess, 186 B.R. at 377-78. However, courts can construe the exceptions no
more narrowly than the language of the statute and legislative history will allow. In re Pelkowski,
990 F.2d at 745; Alibatya, 178 B.R. at 338.
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expenses (extensions of credit) are within the scope of section 523(a)(8) of the
Bankruptcy Code. One federal court within the Fourth Circuit, however, has
addressed the issue.'39 The Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of
Virginia, in Johnson, appeared to follow the "sum of money approach.' 140 If a
federal court in South Carolina were inclined to follow the reasoning of
Johnson, then a strong argument could be made that this case should be limited
to its facts.
In Johnson the debtor attended Virginia Commonwealth University from
the Spring 1992 term until the Fall 1995 term.' 4' The debtor paid all applicable
tuition and fees through the Spring 1995 term, but failed to make tuition and
fee payments for the Summer and Fall 1995 terms.1'4 Nonetheless, the
University allowed her to attend classes anyway. Relying on the maxim that
courts should construe exceptions to discharge in favor of the debtor, the court
found that the reasoning of the courts following the narrow "sum of money"
approach was more persuasive in this case.'" Of particular interest to the court
was the fact that nothing in the record indicated that the debtor made any
arrangements to borrow money from the University or through a student loan
program and that the University did not require the debtor to sign a promissory
note. "'45 Based on these facts, the court held that nonpayment in this situation
could not amount to an educational loan for purposes of section 523(a)(8) of
the Bankruptcy Code.'"
The court recognized that many courts adopt a broader interpretation of
section 523(a)(8) of the Bankruptcy Code that looks to the intent of the
parties. 47 The court cited many cases that relied on a promissory note or some
other form of agreement to find extensions of credit nondischargeable' 48
However, the court never specifically rejected the broader approach. 49 Instead,
it held that the narrow "sum of money" approach was more persuasive in this
instance. 5° The court limited its analysis to a situation where the University
remained silent while the debtor attended classes without paying for tuition.'
Therefore, it is unclear from the opinion if the result would be different if the
debtor had signed a promissory.note acknowledging her debt to the University.
139. Johnson v. Va. Commonwealth Univ. (In re Johnson), 222 B.R. 783 (Bankr. E.D. Va.
1998).
140. Id. at 787.
141. Id. at 785.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 787.
145. Johnson, 222 B.R. at 787.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 786-87.
148. Id. The cases the court cited follow an approach similar to the approach the Renshaw
court adopted. Id.
149. See id. at 787.
150. Id.
151. See Johnson, 222 B.R. at 787.
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Until Congress defines what constitutes a loan for purposes of section
523(a)(8) of the Bankruptcy Code, courts will continue to struggle with
whether extensions of credit by an educational institution fall within the scope
of this provision. Unfortunately, the lack of uniformity in the federal courts on
this issue leaves educational institutions guessing as to how to keep the doors
open for students with financial need without losing the protection afforded
under section 523(a)(8) of the Bankruptcy Code. The answer to this question
will often depend on which jurisdiction is handling the bankruptcy proceeding,
thus resulting in unequal treatment of creditors and debtors throughout the
country.
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals in Renshaw appears to offer the best
resolution to this issue. In order for an extension of credit by an educational
institution to constitute a loan for purposes of section 523(a)(8) of the
Bankruptcy Code, there must be a prior or contemporaneous contract,
"whereby one party transfers a defined quantity of money, goods, or services
to another, and the other party agrees to pay for the sum or items transferred at
a later date."' 52 This approach conforms to the well-established principles that
courts must construe exceptions to discharge narrowly against the creditor and
in favor of the debtor'53 and that courts must construe exceptions no more
narrowly than the statute's language and legislative history will allow.'54 Under
most definitions of a loan, a loan can easily encompass an extension of credit
by an educational institution. However, under the Renshaw approach, an
educational institution must secure some form of an agreement during the
period in which the credit is extended before it can seek protection under
section 523(a)(8) of the Bankruptcy Code.'55 The emphasis of this approach is
on the substance of the transaction and the parties' intent. Absent some form
of agreement during the period in which the credit is extended, a student's
failure to pay tuition will never ripen into a loan for purposes of section
523(a)(8) of the Bankruptcy Code. By limiting the applicability of section
523(a)(8) of the Bankruptcy Code to extensions of credit by an educational
institution, this approach offers the maximum amount of protection to debtors
that the legislative history and the statute's language allow.
F. Stewart McQueen
152. Cazenovia Coll. v. Renshaw (In re Renshaw), 222 F.3d 82, 88 (2d Cir. 2000).
153. See id. at 86; In re Pelkowski, 990 F.2d 737, 744 (3d Cir. 1993); Roosevelt Univ. v.
Oldham (In re Oldham), 220 B.R. 607,610 (Bankr. E.D. Il. 1998); Alibatya v. N.Y. Univ. (In
re Alibatya), 178 B.R. 335,337 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1995); Seton Hall Univ. v. Van Ess (In re Van
Ess), 186 B.R. 375,377-78.
154. In re Pelkowski, 990 F.2d at 745; Alibatya, 178 B.R. at 338.
155. Renshaw, 222 F.3d at 88.
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